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house transactions, we find little support for the value-added model.  Instead, we find 
that households value a district’s average proficiency test scores.  The primary 
component of the proficiency test score that is capitalized into house prices is the 
parental input component.  The peer group component is also valued, but less strongly.  
The school input component is not valued. 
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“From this year, we will be including in the tables measures of the value added by 
schools so that more sophisticated data is available,” –Department for Education and 
Skills of the United Kingdom (Gledhill, 2002)   
 
 
It is widely accepted that local amenities affect neighborhood house prices, the 
amount of capitalization depending on the demand and supply of the amenity.  Local 
public school quality is among the most important local amenities and it is clear that 
public school quality varies spatially by significant amounts.  A large body of literature 
investigates the relationship between house prices and public school quality.  Over the 
years, proficiency tests have replaced expenditures as the most widely accepted 
measure of school quality in house price hedonic regressions.  But education and labor 
economists increasingly claim that school achievement is not the proper measure of 
school quality.  Instead, the literature increasingly looks to growth over time in student 
achievement or value-added to measure the quality of a school. 
  According to Meyer (1997),  
“The indicators commonly used to assess school performance-average 
and median test scores-are highly flawed.  They tend to be contaminated 
by student mobility and by nonschool factors that contribute to student 
achievement (e.g. student, family, and community characteristics and 
prior achievement)…The conceptually-appropriate indicator of school 
performance is the value-added indicator.  The value-added indicator 
measures school performance using a statistical model that includes, to 
the extent possible, all of the nonschool factors that contribute to growth 
in student achievement.  The objective is to statistically isolate the 
contribution of schools to student achievement growth from these other 
factors.” 
 
  The value-added approach argues that a school is responsible for the additional 
knowledge that it imparts to its students.  It is not responsible for the students’ innate 
aptitudes or their parents’ characteristics.  Therefore, “good” schools are not necessarily 
the ones with the highest test scores, because high levels of achievement may simply 
  2reflect parents’ characteristics.  Instead, a good school is one with a high value-added: a 
school that takes the students it is given and adds significantly to their knowledge.   
Many researchers in the labor and education economics literatures have adopted 
the value-added approach.  Among the early works in the area are Boardman and 
Murnane (1979) and Aitkin and Longford (1986).  More recent works in this expanding 
line of research include Hanushek and Taylor (1990), Hanushek (1992), Gomes-Neto et 
al. (1997), Hunt-McCool and Bishop (1998), and Figlio (1999).  State governments are 
increasingly focusing on the value-added of schools by measuring the gain in student 
test scores, including South Carolina, Tennessee, California, Texas and Kentucky.
1  
Some states have begun to provide financial incentives to schools that score well on 
these measures. 
  Even if public policy and large portions of the education and labor economics 
literatures adopt value-added measures, we question whether households care more 
about value-added than about levels of school achievement.  The housing market can 
help decide this question, and it can also reveal the relative importance of peers, 
parents, and the school-specific component of public school quality.  However, little work 
has been done in this area. 
  Capitalization of school quality into house prices affects many households.  In the 
fourth quarter of 2001, 68.0 percent of U.S. households were homeowners (U.S. HUD 
2002, Table 27) and there were over 73 million owner-occupied housing units.  We find 
that house prices vary by about 20% when comparing a school district with student 
achievement that is one standard deviation below the mean to a district with 
achievement that is one standard deviation above the mean.  This variation in house 
price has a substantial impact on household wealth.  Assuming an average house value 
of $185,000, a two standard deviation increase in school quality implies an increase in 
the average homeowner’s wealth by $37,000.
2  Thus, the issue about capitalization of 
  3school quality into house prices affects many U.S. households and the size of the impact 
is substantial.  Further study of what aspects of school quality are capitalized is needed. 
We decompose student achievement into a parent component, a peer 
component, and a school input component.  Using a data set of 27,000 housing 
transactions in the state of Ohio, we include these three components of school quality in 
a hedonic house price regression.  We find that house prices are affected most by the 
impact of a community’s parental characteristics on school achievement.  School 
specific peer effects also influence house prices, but to a much smaller degree.  
Variations in purchased inputs across school districts have little impact on student 
performance and we find, correspondingly, that they have little effect on house prices. 
We therefore find very little support for the use of value-added measures of school 
quality when explaining spatial variation in house prices. 
  
I.  Literature  
  Early studies of the relationship between house prices and the quality of local 
education used public school expenditures per pupil as the key school characteristic, 
probably because outcome measures such as test scores were not available (e.g., 
Oates 1969).  Rosen and Fullerton (1977) argued that proficiency test scores are a 
better measure of school output.  Subsequent research generally uses K-12 student 
achievement measures in studies of house value capitalization.
3  Haurin and Brasington 
(1996) use the pass rate on a ninth grade statewide proficiency test to measure student 
achievement.  
  Another reason for the change from using expenditures per pupil to student 
outcomes as the key measure of school quality was that the education production 
function literature found that school inputs have little or no impact on student outcomes 
(Hanushek 1986, 1997).  The consensus opinion is that parental inputs are the dominant 
  4factor in determining K-12 academic outcomes.  The impact of a third input, peer group 
effects, continues to be debated in the literature (Betts 1996), but most evidence 
suggests peer effects occur in grades K-12.
4  Recently, Zimmer and Toma (2000) found 
strong evidence of peer effects in five countries in a study of math achievement.   
Hayes and Taylor (1996) argue that the impact of school quality on house values 
derives from the marginal effect of schools on educational outcomes; that is, the value-
added of a school.  Using Dallas data, they test three models: one based on per pupil 
expenditures, the second based on average achievement in the sixth grade, and the 
third based on the marginal impact of schools’ value-added on achievement.  Their 
value-added model decomposes observed average achievement at time t in the j-th 
school district (Ajt) into the expected effect derived from parental inputs and a school 
district specific residual: 
(1)    Ajt = bo + b1Pj + b2Ajt-1 + ej 
where Pj represents parental characteristics, Ajt-1 is the prior year’s achievement, and ej 
is the random error in district j.
5  Hayes and Taylor assume the value-added by a district 
is the sum of the estimated value of the constant and the predicted value of the district’s 
error term.  They claim that these terms capture all nonparental inputs to school 
outcomes.
6  Using a small sample of 288 observations of house prices, they first test 
whether school expenditures affect house values, but they find no impact.  They also 
test for the impact of average school achievement on house values and find a 
statistically significant effect.  However, when they decompose school achievement into 
“value-added” and the expected achievement based on Pj and Ajt-1, they find that only 
value-added has an impact on house prices.  They conclude that homeowners are not 
willing to pay for residing in the same district as parents or students with a particular set 
of characteristics; rather, they are only willing to pay for school-specific attributes. 
  5Hayes and Taylor’s study raises a key question: do households value levels of K-
12 student achievement or do they value only the district’s value-added to student 
outcomes?  The answer is important to all studies of house prices because controlling 
for variations in school quality is important.  Hayes and Taylor claim that only value-
added is important, but this claim can be criticized in a number of ways.  First, their 
sample size of house prices is quite small.  Second, their measure of value-added is, in 
essence, the random error in the school achievement regression for a single year.  While 
this term contains components of the school-specific value-added to education, it also 
contains the impact of other omitted variables and the truly random component of school 
achievement.  Third, they include past achievement levels as an explanatory variable in 
the house value estimation, but past achievement levels may be the result of school-
specific effects that should be included in the measure of value-added.
7  Fourth, they 
claim that school-specific peer group effects are not part of a school’s value-added.  
However, this claim is inconsistent with their argument that value-added includes all 
nonportable school-specific factors. 
Predating Hayes and Taylor was a study of house prices by Dubin and Goodman 
(1982).  Dubin and Goodman studied the impact of crime and education on house prices 
in Baltimore.  Beginning with 21 school characteristics, they used principal components 
analysis to narrow the list to five school attributes for city schools and six for suburban 
schools.  Although they did not discuss the value-added hypothesis, two of their 
education components are value-added measures.  In their hedonic estimation, they find 
that neither value-added measure significantly affects city house prices, and suburban 
house prices are only marginally affected by one of the value-added measures. 
Downes and Zabel (2002) use a sample of 1,173 house price observations in the 
Chicago metropolitan area to test alternative models of the impact of school quality on 
house prices.  In contrast to Hayes and Taylor, they find that higher average levels of 
  6school achievement raise house values, but their measure of a school district’s value-
added does not.  Downes and Zabel argue that even if value-added is the theoretically 
preferred measure, what is important is the attribute of school quality that households 
value.  Their empirical tests confirm that the housing market values achievement test 
outcomes, one of the most readily available measures of school quality.  A limitation of 
their study is that they do not fully decompose school achievement into its component 
parts, this point elaborated in our model of school achievement.  Their measure of value 
added is an 8
th grade proficiency test, holding constant 6
th grade proficiency test results 
from two years prior.  However, this measure of value added captures only part of the 
value added by a school district.  For example, if a district’s programs substantially 
raised students’ test scores between 1
st and 6
th grades, but scores fell slightly between 
6
th and 8
th grades, then the Downes and Zabel measure penalizes the district for its 
improvements in scores in the elementary school years.  Our measure of value added 
avoids this potential problem. 
Brasington (1999) also studies which measure of educational outcomes is 
capitalized into house prices.  He compares 37 measures of school quality, including 
expenditures per pupil, proficiency test results, and ad-hoc value-added measures.  
Using a standard hedonic housing estimation, he finds that significant explanatory 
variables include proficiency test results and expenditures per pupil, but not the value-
added measures.
8 
In contrast to Hayes and Taylor (1996), Brasington’s and Downes and Zabel’s 
results argue for the possibility that households use easily observed indicators of school 
district achievement when bidding for houses.  However, none of these studies 
addresses the underlying econometric theory needed to test the value-added model.  
The measures of value-added are ad hoc and peer group effects are not accounted for. 
  7  Numerous other recent studies measure the extent of capitalization of school 
quality into house prices.  Nearly all use a measure of average student achievement 
rather than value-added.  Goodman and Thibodeau (1998) use third through fifth grade 
proficiency test results as a control variable in testing for segmentation in the housing 
market and they find that the impact on house prices of the test’s pass rate is positive, 
significant, and large.  Bogart and Cromwell (2000) find mixed and sometimes perverse 
results for Shaker Heights OH; however, they attribute their results to a lack of within-
jurisdiction variation in test scores and unobserved heterogeneity within school 
catchment areas.  Black (1999) finds a positive relationship between house prices and 
the average of fourth grade Massachusetts reading and math proficiency test scores.  
Brasington (2000) finds that Ohio proficiency test scores are positively capitalized into 
house prices.  Sieg et al. (1999) find that math proficiency test scores are positively 
related to the price of California housing in 1987-1995.   
    
II.  A Model of House Prices and K-12 Public School Outcomes with Peer Group 
Effects 
 
  Our basic model assumes that house prices reflect the market values of 
structural attributes of housing, neighborhood characteristics, and selected aspects of a 
community’s K-12 public education (Rosen 1974).  We assume a standard form for the 
empirical hedonic house price function: 
(2)   ln Hij = cH0 + cHXXij + cHYYj 
where ln Hij is the natural logarithm of house value for the i-th house and household in 
the j-th school district, Xij represents house characteristics including quality of 
neighborhood indicators, and Yj is the set of educational outcomes or inputs that are 
valued by households.  Candidates for measures of Yj include the average level of 
  8educational attainment by children in the district (Aj), or the value-added by the district 
(Vj).   
We adopt the education production function approach and initially assume that 
educational attainment is produced with parental inputs (Pi), school inputs (Sj), innate 
child factors (Fi), and peer effects (Rj).  We assume the production function’s form is 
additively separable, implying that parental inputs have the same impact on attainment 
no matter which school district is selected.
9 
(3)      Aij = aA0 + aAPPi + aASSj + aAFFi + aARRj 
When a household selects a school district, the set of peers in the district is 
exogenous, thus peers take on the attribute of a district-specific fixed effect.  The value-
added hypothesis, now expanded to include all district-specific effects, argues that 
house values are influenced by both a district’s purchased inputs and the educational 
impact of a district’s group of student peers; that is, Vj = aASSj + aARRj.   
  Testing the hedonic price model requires observations of house prices, house 
and neighborhood characteristics, and a school district’s educational outcomes, inputs, 
and peer effects.  Although Vj is not directly observed, it can be estimated from (3).  
While our data set reports individual house prices and characteristics, our data on 
student outcomes, parent characteristics, and school inputs is at the school district 
level.
10  Students’ innate abilities and peer effects are unobserved.   
Aggregating (3) to the district level implies: 
(4)      Aj = aA0 + aAP Pj + aASSj + aAFFj + aARRj 
where Aj is average student achievement, Pj is the average of parental inputs, and Fj is 
the average of innate abilities of children in the district.
11   
Addressing the lack of observations of innate student abilities requires an 
assumption about the distribution of ability among students.  Omitting Fj from an 
estimation based on (4) results in omitted variable bias (Hanushek 1979) and is 
  9generally assumed to upward bias the coefficients of the parental characteristics 
variables (Zimmer and Toma 2000).  We note that parents and their children are jointly 
mobile, and neither is part of the value-added of a school.  This observation allows us to 
assume that students’ innate abilities are a stochastic linear function of parental 
characteristics, with no loss of generality in terms of testing our focal hypothesis.  We 
replace Fj in (4) by a constant, a linear term in Pj, and a random error εj, yielding: 
(5)     Aj = aA0 + aAPPj + aASSj + aARRj + εj 
with aA0 and aAP appropriately redefined.   
While the above assumption addresses the problem of unobserved innate 
characteristics, a possible problem is that parents select a school district based on the 
innate abilities of their children, inducing a correlation between Fj and Sj or Rj.  We argue 
that this behavior is unlikely.  Utility maximizing parents will optimize their choice of 
schools by selecting the best school district they can afford given the market’s implicit 
price for the educational quality of the locality.
12  Also, parents rarely send children of 
differing ability to different schools providing evidence that parents are not sorting among 
school districts based on their children’s innate abilities.
13   
The quality of peers may be correlated with other factors explaining student 
achievement; specifically, with average parental characteristics or with a school district’s 
purchased inputs.  In general, we assume the statistical relationship can be described as 
follows: 
(6)   Rj = dR0 + dRPPj + dRSSj + eRj 
where Rj measures peer effects and eR is a mean zero random error. 
  Knowing the values for parental, school, and peer inputs to education, we 
substitute into the house price function (2), yielding:  
(7) ln  Hij = cH0 + cHXXij + cHP Pj* + cHS Sj* + cHR Rj* + ηij. 
  10The variables Pj*, Sj*, and Rj* represent measures of the impact of Pj, Sj, and Rj on 
student achievement; they are not the raw values of these variables.  That is,  
(8) Pj* = âAPPj ; Sj* = âASSj; Rj* = âARRj. 
Peer effects are difficult to observe and if R* is omitted from (5) or (7), the 
remaining coefficients may be biased.
14  The consequences for tests of our hypotheses 
are twofold.  First, the expected values of the coefficients of P and S in the education 
production function when R is omitted are E(âAS) = aAS + aAR dRS and E(âAP) = aAP +  
aAR dRP (Kmenta, 1986: 450).  It is plausible that aAR > 0, dRS > 0, and dRP ≥ 0, yielding 
upward bias in the coefficients of P and S in (5).  This bias causes measurement errors 
in P* and S* as shown by inspecting (8).  However, these measurement errors are the 
same multiple for all observations, thus the t-statistics and goodness of fit measure of 
these variables when inserted in the house value equation are unaffected; only the 
coefficients’ values are affected.  In addition, testing described later suggests that, for 
our sample, any bias that has been introduced by omitting peer effects is small.  The 
implications of the omission of peer group effects from (7) for interpretation of the house 
value estimation are more serious.  Even if P* and S* are measured without error, the 
expected values of the key coefficients in (7) would be biased: E(ĉHS) = cHS + cHRdRS and 
E(ĉHP) = cHP + cHRdRP.   
We address the issue of unobserved peer effects by using multiple observations 
of each district’s educational outcome, with n designating the n-th observation in district 
j, n = 1…N.  Instead of (5) we estimate: 
(9) Ajn = aA0 + aAPPj + aASSj + εjn.   
Because all the observations of test scores in a district occur at the same time, the 
values of Pj and Sj do not vary over n.  Another implication of the invariance of Pj and Sj 
  11across the multiple observations for a district is that a fixed effects model cannot be 
estimated using this data set.   
Using (5) and (6), we find that the estimation residual for the n-th observation of 
district j in (9) is: 
(10) Ajn – Âjn = aAR eRj + εjn.      
The first term on the right hand side of (10) is the coefficient of the peer group effect in 
the educational attainment equation multiplied by the random error of equation (6).  The 
second term is the random error in the education production function.  Of course, the 
expected value of Ajn – Âjn in the full sample is 0; however, the expected value of  
Ajn – Âjn in the j-th school district is aAR eRj ≠ 0.  This nonzero value occurs because eRj in 
(9) is common to all N observations of the j-th district.  The key point is that, for each 
district, we have multiple observations of the component of the peer group effect in (6) 
that is not correlated with either parental influences or district inputs.  We define R’ = aAR 
eRj and discuss its estimation in the next section of the paper. 
Next, we substitute R’ for R* in the house value equation (7): 
(11)    ln Hij = cH0 + cHXXij + cHP Pj* + cHS Sj* + cHR R’j + ηij. 
Because, by construction, R’ is uncorrelated with P and S, its inclusion does not affect 
the expected value of the estimates of ĉHP and ĉHS, thus they may be biased.  However, 
the coefficient of R’ is an unbiased estimator of the coefficient of R* yielding an estimate, 
ĉHR, of the impact of K-12 public school peer groups on house values.  If ĉHR = 0, student 
peers do not affect house values, and in this case, the coefficients of P* and S* in (11) 
are unbiased.  Otherwise, some bias may be present depending on the size of the 
coefficient of R’. 
The value-added model argues that both school inputs and peers affect house 
values.  It also argues that parental effects on student achievement have no effect on 
  12house values.  Our analysis of biases indicates that the coefficient of P* in (10) may be 
nonzero even if there are no underlying parental effects.  Thus, our key tests for the 
value-added hypothesis are of the values of cHS and cHR.  Support for the value added 
hypothesis requires these coefficients to be positive, statistically significant, and 
reasonably large. 
Downes and Zabel (2002) and Brasington (1999) find that average achievement 
levels are significant when explaining house values while their measures of value-added 
are not.  We modify (11) to test the hypothesis that households use average student 
achievement to determine their bids for housing: 
(12) ln  Hij = ∀H0 + cHXXij + ∀HA Aj + ηAij. 
  
III.  Data and Estimation 
House price observations are based on transaction data for 1991 and are drawn 
from six urban areas in Ohio (Amerestate 1991).  We eliminate central city school 
districts from the sample, leaving 123 suburban districts.  A total of 27,232 house prices 
are observed.  We use three measures of K-12 educational attainment in Ohio: the 
percentage of students passing all parts of the fourth, ninth, and twelfth grade 
proficiency tests administered to public schools students.
15  The average pass rate 
differs for the three tests because of differences in difficulty and in the minimum score for 
passing, so we measure the results as deviations from each test’s mean.
16 
  The hedonic house price equation includes vectors of house attributes contained 
in the Amerestate data and variables that measure amenities and disamenities across 
local governments (Office of Criminal Justice Services 1994; MESA Group 1994).    
Explanatory variables in the education production function are drawn from various 
sources including the Ohio Department of Education (1995) and the School District Data 
  13Book (MESA Group 1994). These variables are similar to those in Haurin and Brasington 
(1996), who list detailed definitions in their data appendix.   
Measures of school inputs in the education production function include the 
teacher-pupil ratio, teacher education (percent with MA degrees, percent with more 
education than a BA but less than a MA), teacher experience, the dropout rate, the 
attendance rate, and expenditures per pupil.  Measures of parental inputs include their 
education (percent not finishing high school, percent completing high school but no 
further education), percent in poverty, average real income, percent two-parent families, 
percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent resident in the community for less than six 
years, and the percent homeowners.   
House characteristics include lot size and its square, number of rooms and its 
square, garage size, number of full and half baths, house age and its square, and 
dummy variables for the presence of pools, decks, fireplaces, and air conditioning.  
Neighborhood variables include average household income, the crime rate, the 
percentage of minority households, and the effective property tax rate.  House values 
tend to vary throughout the year so we include quarterly seasonal variables, omitting 
spring.  We also include five dummy variables for the six major urban areas in Ohio that 
are the source of our data (Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Akron, and Dayton, 
omitting Toledo). 
  We first estimate the education production function in (9) for 123 districts and 
three test score results and calculate the residuals following (10).  The average residual 
for each district is our estimate of R’, the peer effect.
17  We then create Pj* and Sj* based 
on the estimation results.  Finally, we estimate the house price equations (11) and (12), 
after correcting for heteroskedasticity.
18 
 
  14IV.  Results 
The estimation results for the reduced-form education production function are in 
Table 1.  Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, fixed and random effects models 
are inapplicable.  However, the results of a Bera and Jarque (1980) test and correlation 
of regressors with residuals suggest that ordinary least squares is appropriate in this 
instance.  The Bera and Jarque test cannot reject the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors for two of our three test grades, and previous education production 
functions using a similar data set have also passed this test for an absence of omitted 
variable bias (Brasington, 2002b).
19  As a further check, we note that omitted variable 
bias is a problem of the error term being correlated with included regressors.  The 
correlation with least squares residuals is less than 0.10 in absolute value for all 
explanatory variables in all test sections, further suggesting that ordinary least squares 
will provide relatively unbiased parameter estimates. 
All else constant, we find that the greater the percentage of parents with less 
than a high school degree or with only a high school degree, the lower are student test 
scores.  The higher the percentage of parents in the district that are Black or Hispanic, 
the lower are average test scores.  The greater the mobility rate in the district, the lower 
are test scores.  Among the school input variables, the only significant findings are that 
the dropout rate is negatively related to test passage and that student attendance is 
positively related to test passage.  Variations in real expenditures per pupil do not have a 
significant impact on test scores. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The estimate of the baseline hedonic house price equation in (11) is presented in 
Table 2.  The coefficients of house and neighborhood characteristics all have the 
expected signs and their sizes are plausible.  The key coefficients are those of P*, S*, 
and R’.  All are positive and statistically significant.  Because they are measured in the 
  15same units (test score points), the coefficients can be directly compared.  A Wald test 
confirms that they differ substantially in size.
20  The impact of the component of test 
scores attributable to parental characteristics is much larger than that of school inputs or 
peer effects.  The relatively small size of the peer group coefficient suggests that the 
bias in the coefficient of P* is not serious. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The critical observation derived from Table 2 is that the value-added model is not 
supported.  Very little value is attached to school inputs and peer effects.  The impact of 
average parental attributes on house prices is much larger.  Changing the parents’ 
component from one standard deviation below the mean to one above the mean raises 
house values by 20 percent.  The same change for the peer effect raises house values 
by only 1.3 percent. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  Table 3 reports selected estimation results for an alternative model, which argues 
that only the aggregate level of achievement influences house prices.  When Aj is 
substituted for the three components of average achievement, it has a positive and 
highly significant coefficient, and the adjusted R
2 falls by only a small amount.  This 
result suggests that proficiency test results may be the key variable that bidders uses 
when determining offers for houses.   
 
Spatial Statistics Approach 
It is of course possible that our regressions omit factors important to the 
explanation of house prices.  Downes and Zabel (2002) find that failing to account for 
unobserved effects does not bias the parameter estimates of the school quality 
variables, and our baseline model has included MSA dummies to capture any omitted 
influences that differ across urban areas.  Still, Downes and Zabel’s finding may be 
  16specific to their data set, and MSA dummies may be inadequate controls for omitted 
variable bias.  Therefore we employ spatial statistics as a more sophisticated technique 
for addressing omitted variable bias.   
House price hedonic regressions with individual sale prices tend not to be 
statistically independent.  In fact, tests for statistical independence often show spatial 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  Such spatial autocorrelation is to be expected:  the 
price of a given house is similar to the price of nearby houses, and this similarity 
diminishes with distance.  Moreover, non-housing determinants of house value are not 
fully captured by the variables included in the hedonic regressions (LeSage 1997, 1998).  
Estimating a house price hedonic with ordinary least squares does not account for 
spatial dependence between observations, which may lead to biased, inefficient and 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988, p. 58-59).  A study by He and Winder 
(1999) demonstrates bi-directional price causality between three adjacent housing 
markets in Virginia, illustrating a case of spatial dependence in housing markets.   
The spatial Durbin model can address the problem of spatial dependence in 
house value regressions (Pace and Barry, 1997a).
21  The spatial Durbin model includes 
a spatial lag of the dependent variable v as well as spatial lags of the explanatory 
variables in X: 
 
(13) v  =  ρWv + Xβ +WXα + ε 
where ε  ~ N(0,σ
2In).  In (13) the scalar term ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter.  It 
measures the degree of spatial dependence between the values of nearby houses in the 
sample.  The W term is an n by n spatial weight matrix.  It has non-zero entries in the 
i,jth position, reflecting houses that are nearest neighbors to each of the i homes in the 
sample.  In this manner the spatial weight matrix W summarizes the spatial configuration 
of the houses in the sample.
22  Next, X is the explanatory variable matrix X with the 
  17intercept excluded, and α is the parameter associated with the spatial lag of the 
explanatory variables. 
The Wv term in (13) captures the extent to which the price of each house is 
affected by the price of neighboring houses (Bolduc et al., 1995; Griffith, 1988, p.82-83).  
For example, when a house is put on the market, the offer price is often set with the 
knowledge of the selling price of similar houses in the neighborhood.  Multiple listing 
services publish offer prices and newspapers publish sale prices, thus offers and bids on 
houses are be influenced by offers and bids on nearby houses.   
The WXα term in (13) allows the structural characteristics of neighboring houses 
to influence the price of each house.  A common saying in real estate is to never own the 
largest (or the smallest) house on the block:  the market will force such a house to sell at 
a discount, an example of the type of impact captured by WXα.  The WXα term allows 
other structural characteristics of neighboring houses to affect the sale price of each 
house.  Glower, et al. (1998) find that the degree that a house is atypical influences its 
time on the market and sale price, so it may be important to incorporate the structural 
characteristics of neighboring houses into the house price hedonic. 
The WXα term also captures the influence that the neighborhood characteristics 
of nearby houses have on the sale price of each house.  Crime may impose negative 
externalities and therefore spill over across city boundaries.  In addition, the tax 
competition literature suggests that the tax rate charged by a neighboring taxing 
jurisdiction will affect the tax rate chosen by the home jurisdiction, which may in turn 
affect house prices.  The WXα term allows for these types of spillovers. 
The log-likelihood for the model in (13), concentrated with respect to the 
parameters β and σ, takes the following form (Anselin, 1988, p. 181; Pace and Barry, 
1997a): 
  18(14)  ln L = C + ln |In - ρW| -(n/2)ln(e′e)  
where: e = eo - ρed, eo = v - Zβo, ed = Wv - Zβd, βo = (Z′Z)
-1Z′v, βd = (Z′Z)
-1Z′Wv, 
Z = [X WXIn], and C is a constant term that does not involve the parameters.   
The need to compute the log-determinant of the n by n matrix (In - ρW) makes it 
computationally difficult to solve the maximum likelihood problem in (14).  Operation 
counts for computing this determinant grow with the cube of n for dense matrices.  
However, the matrix W is sparse.  The sparsity of W may be exploited (Pace, 1997; 
Pace and Barry, 1997a) so that a personal computer can handle the 27,233-observation 
regression with computational ease.  The Cholesky decomposition is used in Barry and 
Pace’s (1999) Monte Carlo estimator to compute the log-determinant over a grid of 
values for ρ restricted to the interval [0,1]. 
The sparse spatial Durbin procedure has been demonstrated to greatly improve 
cross-sectional regression estimates that are spatial in nature (Pace, 1998; Pace and 
Barry, 1997b).  Part of the improvement stems from incorporating the influence of 
omitted variables (Anselin, 1988, p.103; Pace, Barry and Sirmans, 1998).  Alternative 
methods to address the problem include using highly aggregated dummy variables, 
focusing on narrow geographic areas where many influences are already controlled, or 
including a very large number of explanatory variables.  Still, using aggregate dummy 
variables does little to capture localized sources of omitted variable bias.  Studies with 
limited geographic coverage have limited appeal, and structural characteristics may be 
similar within small areas so that multicollinearity problems are exacerbated.  In addition, 
no matter how large the number of explanatory variables, regressions may still omit 
important influences like air quality, landscaping quality, and proximity to parks.  
Because it incorporates the influence of omitted variables, spatial statistics can improve 
explanatory power and reduce the parameter estimate bias that generally results from 
  19omitting a relevant variable.  A detailed proof of how spatial statistics achieves 
consistent and unbiased parameter estimates, unbiased estimates of the standard 
errors, and efficient parameter estimates where least squares may not, is available in 
Griffith (1988, p. 94-107). 
The results for the spatial model are reported in the lower panel of Table 3.  The 
adjusted R-squared has risen from 0.66 in the least squares model to 0.95 in the spatial 
model.  The 0.77 estimate of ρ suggests strong spatial dependence in the data, possibly 
stemming from the captured influence of spillovers and omitted variable bias.  We find 
that the coefficient of the school input component of student achievement becomes 
negative and loses its statistical significance.  Even more than the least squares model, 
the spatial model suggests little role for a school’s value added.  There also is evidence 
of the upward bias in the parent component:  the non-spatial model had a coefficient 
estimate of 0.019, while in the spatial model the estimate drops to 0.014.  However, the 




Our results reject the hypothesis that the market price of housing reflects the 
value added to student achievement by a school district.  We find that the coefficient of 
the variable measuring the impact of school inputs on student achievement is small and 
it is not consistently statistically different than zero in house value regressions, 
particularly in regressions that control for the effects of omitted variables.   
We find evidence that households value the quality of peer group influences in a 
school district; however, the impact is small.  A change in the peer effect from one 
standard deviation above the mean to one standard deviation below the mean lowers 
house values by 1.3 percent, this equaling about $1,100 in our sample. 
  20We find that positive parental influences on student achievement are highly 
valued in the housing market.  A change in the parental influence measure from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean implies a 
20 percent increase in house value.  We also find that the average level of student 
achievement performs nearly as well as a decomposition of student achievement into 
peer, parental, and school effects in the house price estimation. 
  These findings must be interpreted in the context of the hedonic price model.  We 
know from Rosen’s 1974 analysis that the coefficients in the hedonic housing price 
equation reflect market values, not supply or demand.  Interpretations of why the 
housing market values particular inputs or outputs are speculative.  Still, it is tempting to 
suggest that average student achievement affects house prices because it is readily 
observable.  Peer effects and school effects are less easily observed, so households 
seem to use more easily observed parental characteristics (race and education) or 
proficiency test outcomes as the key factor in comparing public school quality among 
school districts.  
From an empirical perspective, it is much easier to include a district’s proficiency 
test scores in a hedonic house price estimation than to include a set of school inputs and 
proxies for peer group effects or parental characteristics.  Thus, we find support for the 
increasingly common practice of including K-12 test scores as a control variable in 
hedonic house price equations.   
  If the own-parent impact on the education of a child is portable among school 
districts, why are parents’ attributes valued in the housing market even when controlling 
for racial composition, crime rates, household income, and tax rates?  Perhaps parental 
characteristics, such as high levels of education, are valued because these parents 
continually apply pressure to school administrators for better performance and for 
delivery of a high quality education.  Using Rosen’s underlying framework for hedonic 
  21models as guidance, the results suggest that the set of communities with favorable 
parent characteristics may be in short supply compared with household demand, bidding 
up their market price. 
  Our results suggest that the school-specific component of school quality, that is, 
the value-added of a school, is not highly valued by the housing market.  If the housing 
market provides a valid assessment of the value-added approach to measuring school 
quality, our results question the use of value-added in the education and labor 
economics literatures.  However, our results do not necessarily make value-added an 
inappropriate measure of school quality for policymakers.  Policymakers may wish to 
reward schools for improvement, rather than for absolute levels of achievement.  Still, 
our results suggest that the value-added of a school is not the measure of school quality 
that homeowners use when they decide which house to buy.   
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Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Mean 
Constant     -59.52   1.16   
% With Both Parents  -1.58   0.16  0.79 
% Parents with Education less than H.S. Diploma  -23.94   2.47  0.11 
% Parent with Education of only H.S. Diploma  -32.63   5.36  0.34 
% Parents in Poverty        14.37   0.78  0.06 
Average Household Real Income ($000)   -0.01   0.25  39.21    
% Homeowners  1.57   0.25  0.74 
% Black Households       -19.30   5.56  0.08 
% Hispanic Households      -41.36   2.42  0.01 
% Households Residing in Locality for Less than 
6 Years 
-15.49  2.17  0.44 
Teacher-Pupil Ratio       -143.30   1.52  0.06 
% Teachers with Education > BA but < Masters 
Degree 
-1.98  0.33  0.29 
% Teachers with Education > Masters Degree      5.51   0.91  0.48 
Average Teacher Experience in Years  -0.10   0.48  15.48 
Student Attendance Rate   0.92   1.71  94.75     
Student Drop Out Rate   -0.67   2.50  2.86 
Real Expenditures per Pupil ($000)     0.89   1.28  4.99 
        
Sample Size     369       
Adjusted R-square  0.63      
 
1 The mean test score (normed) is 0.0 with standard deviation of 10.9.
  29Table 2: Estimates of Log of House Prices
1 
  
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Mean 
Intercept 10.137   91.17 
Achievement: Parents’ Component (P*)  0.019   21.65 
Achievement: School Component (S*)  0.004   3.16 
Achievement: Peer Group Component (R’)  0.002   3.30 
    
Air Conditioning  0.079   17.23  0.43
Fireplace 0.126   28.12  0.45
Lot Size (0000)  0.119   17.63  1.24
Lot Size-squared  -0.014   10.35  2.53
Age (10)  -0.028   9.31  3.54
Age-squared -0.001   5.33  17.58
Number of Rooms  0.122   10.45  6.29
Number of Rooms-squared  -0.004   4.02  41.25
Garage 0.146   23.69  0.90
Number of Full Baths  0.136   27.32  1.38
Number of Partial Baths  0.101   22.74  0.42
Deck 0.055   9.89  0.14
Pool 0.060   4.10  0.02
2
nd Quarter  0.052   9.61  0.31
3
rd Quarter  0.055   9.95  0.28
4
th Quarter  0.055   9.52  0.23
Akron -0.049   4.68  0.08
Cincinnati -0.009   1.02  0.17
Cleveland 0.063   7.15  0.39
Columbus -0.033   3.75  0.13
Dayton 0.013   1.44  0.17
Crime Rate  -1.500   5.65  0.01
% Minority Households  -0.090   2.96  0.08
Average Real Household Income (000)  0.003   8.27  38.98
Effective Property Tax Rate   0.373   0.98  0.03
        
Sample Size  27,233       
Adjusted R-square  0.658      
 
1The mean of the log of house price is 11.23. 
  30Table 3: Comparative Results for other House Price Estimations
1 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic 
Average Achievement Only    
Average Student Achievement  0.008   17.94 
    
Adjusted R-square  0.653    
    
   Likelihood 
Ratio 
Spatial Model    
    
Achievement: Parents’ Component (P*)  0.014   128.8 
Achievement: School Component (S*)  -0.005     4.2
a 
Achievement: Peer Group Component (R’)  0.003     5.2
 
    
Adjusted R-square  0.95    
Estimated spatial autocorrelation coefficient  0.77    
 
1 Dependent variable is log house prices.  All estimations include the complete set of control variables.  To 
conserve space, we present only the results for our focal variables.  Full regression results are available 
upon request.   
aFails to exceed the critical likelihood ratio of 4.61 at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 While not necessarily the most appropriate measure of value-added, improvement in 
test scores is a type of value-added measure (Hanushek and Taylor 1990).  Some 
states’ accountability for improvement lies at the school level, such as Kentucky, while 
other states such as Tennessee hold individual teachers and students accountable for 
improvement. 
2   The wealth increase for the owner of the median valued home would be about 
$29,500. 
3  Early studies using K-12 test scores in house price estimations include Sonstelie and 
Portney (1980), Li and Brown (1980), and Jud and Watts (1981).  All find that test scores 
positively affect house prices. 
4  Support for the hypothesis that peers influence student achievement is found in 
Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson et al. (1978), and Betts and Morell (1999).  
Evans et al. (1992), in a study of teenage pregnancy, finds evidence of peer effects in a 
single equation estimation, but when parental sorting among localities is accounted for in 
a 2SLS estimation, the peer effects tend to disappear.   
5  Their model is closely based on Hanushek and Taylor (1990).  
6  Hayes and Taylor (1996) refer to the component of achievement that is not a school 
effect as a peer effect.  Their definition of peer effects includes family effects on 
educational attainment, but peers and own-families have different impacts on 
achievement.  Also, it is curious that they do not expect peer groups (which are school-
specific) to affect house values in the same way that school inputs affect house values.      
7 Hayes and Taylor (1996) identify school-specific effects based on one-year changes in 
educational outcomes (fifth to sixth grade).  However, the housing market should value 
school-specific effects for all grade levels.  These prior effects are imbedded in their Ajt-1   33
                                                                                                                                                 
variable and its contribution is not counted as part of their measure of school-specific 
value-added. 
8  Brasington (1999) also uses a spatial autocorrelation model to estimate house prices 
and still finds proficiency levels more consistently capitalized, but the results are weaker. 
9   Our assumed form of educational production function is the same as that made by 
Zimmer and Toma (2000). 
10 Only twelve of our 123 school districts have more than one high school, so the 9
th and 
12
th grade outcomes are observed at the individual school level for over 90% of the 
sample. 
11  We assume that children are distributed equally among households in the district. 
12  Epple and Romano (1998) discuss the evidence about the differential impact of peers 
on students of differing innate ability levels.  They conclude that there is no compelling 
empirical evidence supporting any particular differential impact.   
13 Altonji and Dunn (1996) find no evidence that siblings of differing motivation level and 
ability attend different schools.  Only 20% of their sibling sample attended different 
schools, and most of those cases involved relocation and divorce.  In only five percent of 
their sample did one sibling attend private school while another did not.  Other studies 
assume that omitted ability of a child does not bias parameter estimates because innate 
ability may be “unknown to parents, or, if known, may not be acknowledged in the 
decision process [of parents]” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994, p. 678). 
14  Although we assume that Rj* represents peer effects, it also captures other 
unobserved district-specific fixed effects that influence educational attainment and are 
valued by home buyers. 
15  The tests include reading, math, citizenship, science, and writing components.   34
                                                                                                                                                 
16  The standard deviations of the three tests are similar: 3.14, 3.31, and 3.43 for the 
fourth, ninth, and twelfth grade tests. 
17  The range of R’ is from -10.32 to 12.93.  The standard deviation is 4.09. 
18  We test for heteroskedasticity using White’s test.  With a critical value of 49.6 at the 
1% level of significance, our calculated test statistic of 1008.0 rejects the null of 
homoskedasticity.  Possible generated regressor bias and heteroskedasticity are 
addressed using an appropriate weighting scheme, as detailed in Brasington (2002a). 
19 With a critical LM of 9.21, the 4
th, 9
th, and 12
th grade tests show calculated LM values 
of 13.2, 6.5, and 3.95.  Brasington (2002b) uses an education production function based 
on 1992 Ohio math proficiency test outcomes and cannot reject the null for either his 
urban or rural samples. 
20  The Wald F for the test of equality of the three coefficients is 143, substantially 
greater than the 1% critical value of 4.6. 
21 The spatial Durbin model is also known as the unrestricted version of the mixed 
regressive spatially autoregressive model with common factor specification. 
22 LeSage (1997) presents an intuitive discussion of the spatial weight matrix and of 
spatial statistics in general.   